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UNBOUNDED EXPECTATIONS AND THE SHOOTING ROOM
Abstract. Several treatments of the Shooting Room Paradox have failed to rec-
ognize the crucial role played by its involving a number of players unbounded in
expectation. We indicate Reflection violations and/or Dutch Book vulnerabilities
in extant “solutions” and show that the paradox does not arise when the expected
number of participants is finite; the Shooting Room thus takes its place in the
growing list of puzzles that have been shown to require infinite expectation. Rec-
ognizing this fact, we conclude that prospects for a “straight solution” are dim to
nonexistent.
1. Introduction
Several well-known puzzles and paradoxes philosophers have been discussing in the
previous couple decades, including the the St. Peterburg Paradox (see e.g. Martin
2001), the Two Envelopes Problem (see e.g. Chalmers 1994), the so-called Pasadena
Game (Nover and Ha´jek 2004), etc., crucially involve quantities unbounded in expec-
tation. The Shooting Room (Leslie 1996) is a puzzle that clearly involves a quantity
unbounded in expectation. Heretofore, however, published treatments have failed to
indicate in a clear way that this involvement is crucial. In this paper we pay infinite
expectation the respect it is due. In particular, we won’t try to surmount it.
William Eckhardt (1997) reworks the puzzle to his comfort zone:
Successive groups of individuals are brought into a room and given the
same highly favorable wager, say, betting $100.00 that the “house,”
with fair dice, rolls anything but double sixes. (In the original formu-
lation, losing players are shot, but this added gruesomeness, if nothing
else, complicates the question of how one should bet.) Whenever the
room occupants win their bets, ten times as many people are recruited
for the next round. Once the house wins, the game series is over. So
the house can truthfully announce before any games are played that, in
spite of the highly favorable odds, at least 90% of all players will lose.
The puzzle is that these bets appear to be both favorable and unfavor-
able: favorable because double sixes are rare, unfavorable because the
overwhelming majority of players lose.
We will make a few cosmetic changes/addenda to the above scenario. First, one
person bets in the first round, nine in the second round, ninety in the third, then nine
hundred, nine thousand, etc. Next, the players are stipulated to have epistemically
similar backgrounds and bet in isolation from each other; they can’t tell how many
others are betting in that round. Finally, the results of the bets are only announced
at an open (players can count the number of attendees) debriefing attended by all
the players from all the rounds of betting.
1
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Eckhardt argues for a credence of 1
36
in I lose prior to the roll one is betting on, but
is also comfortable, so far as we can tell, in a credence ≈ 9
10
in I lose once the bets
are concluded:
“...it is an error to consider yourself a random or typical player until
you lose your bet. Before then, you have only about a 3% chance of
belonging to the 90% majority. ... This means you should not consider
yourself random until the game series is over. ...if a player about to
bet were truly random among all players, then he would have better
than a 90% chance of losing....””
What troubles us is the emphasized (in the original) clause, which appears to sanction
a belief, by the player, that she has lost with 90% probability once “the game series
is over” (at the debriefing, in our version). We don’t accept that any “solution”
endorsing this has dissolved the paradox; a player having credence 1
36
in I lose at the
time the bet is placed, knowing that with probability 1 the game will end and she
will have credence of at least 9
10
at the debriefing, violates Reflection (not merely in
its naive formulations but in its apparently valid ones; see Schervish et. al. 2004).
In an enlightening paper, Paul Bartha and Christopher Hitchcock (1999) offer a way
out of the seeming paradox. Assigning “draft positions” to the potential participants
that determine the order in which they will be called to the room, they show that
if an individual has any countably additive probability distribution over her possible
draft position, her expected credence in I lose at the debriefing will be precisely 1
36
.
To see this let pn be the probability of a “draft round” equal to n + 1 (e.g. if your
“draft position” is in {11, 12, . . . , 100}, your “draft round” is 3) and note that:
(1) Prior probability in I play is
∑∞
n=0(
35
36
)npn.
(2) Posterior in I lose conditional on 10x present at debriefing is px
p0+p1+···+px .
(3) Probability of 10x present conditional on I play is
Pr(10x)Pr(play |10x)
Pr(play)
=
(35
36
)x( 1
36
)(p0 + p1 + · · ·+ px)∑∞
n=0(
35
36
)npn
, hence
(4) Expectation of posterior in I lose at debriefing conditional on I play is
∞∑
x=0
(35
36
)x( 1
36
)(p0 + p1 + · · ·+ px)∑∞
n=0(
35
36
)npn
( px
p0 + p1 + · · ·+ px
)
=
1
36
.
This solves the Reflection problem but introduces a new one in its place. Since
we assume that the participants have similar epistemic experiences prior to being
assigned draft numbers, it seems reasonable that we should (or indeed that we must)
also assume that all participants have the same prior distribution over their own
numbers. This, however, implies that any large enough finite subset of the participant
pool is subject to a group Dutch Book.1 Indeed, choosing an n such that pn > 0, offer
to each participant in a group having cardinality K > 10
n
pn
a bet paying 1− pn if that
1We see no reason to think that group Dutch Books aren’t incriminating in the way that individual
ones are in cases where a given participant views her fellow group members as peers. That much can
be assumed here, as the participants are evidential counterparts having identical credence functions.
UNBOUNDED EXPECTATIONS AND THE SHOOTING ROOM 3
participant has a draft round equal to n + 1 and −pn otherwise. The participants
view these bets as fair, but since at most 9 · 10n−1 participants can win their bet and
at least K − 9 · 10n−1 must lose, accepting them ensures a net payoff of at most
9 · 10n−1(1− pn)− pn(K − 9 · 10n−1) = 9 · 10n−1 − pnK < −10n−1.
Bartha and Hitchcock sum up the problems with a countably additive prior thus:
“...the weakness of this analysis is its inability to accomodate the intuition that (the
participant) is equally likely to have any draft position.” They then offer another
analysis in which participants have a merely finitely additive distribution over draft
positions assigning equal infinitesimal weight to each natural number n.
Without going into the specifics of how, Bartha and Hitchcock conclude that, al-
though conditional on the participant being selected to enter the room and the ex-
periment having ended with a losing round, the probability that she lost is indeed
9
10
, it is however the case that conditional just on the participant being selected, the
probability that she lost is 1
36
. The explanation, roughly, as for why this is so is
that, conditional on the participant being selected to enter the room, the probability
that the experiment ends isn’t equal to 1, but rather is equal to the probability of
obtaining a large straight on the first roll of a Yahtzee turn2, namely 5
162
. Thus
Prob(Lose|Selected)
=Prob(End|Selected)Prob(Lose|End & Selected)
+ Prob(No End|Selected)Prob(Lose|No End & Selected)
=
(
5
162
)(
9
10
)
+
(
157
162
)(
0
1
)
=
1
36
.(1.1)
But this merely pushes the paradox back a round. Indeed, Bartha and Hitchcock
look to be committed to a probability of the participant being in a final winning
round, conditional on the participant being selected to enter the room, of 1
360
; she is
one-tenth as likely to be in a final winning round as in a losing round. That is:
Prob(Final Winning|Selected)
=Prob(End|Selected)Prob(Final Winning & Selected)
+ Prob(No End|Selected)Prob(Final Winning|No End & Selected)
=
(
5
162
)(
9
100
)
+
(
157
162
)(
0
1
)
=
1
360
.(1.2)
More generally, they should say that conditional on her entering the room, the prob-
ability that there are exactly n winning rounds after hers is ( 1
10
)n+1 1
36
. The fact that∑∞
n=−1(
1
10
)n+1 1
36
= 5
162
would appear to provide evidence that this is in fact what
Bartha and Hitchcock would assent to.
2Coincidentally, of course.
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And that’s just as puzzling as the original paradox. Indeed, Bartha and Hitchcock
owe an explanation3 for why it isn’t the case that
Prob(Final Winning|Selected) = 35
36
· 1
36
=
35
1296
.
If no satisfactory explanation is forthcoming (it is hard to imagine that one is), one
must conclude that Bartha and Hitchcock’s argument fails.
2. Infinite repeated Shooting Room
At the beginning of the paper we promised an analysis of the Shooting Room paradox
showcasing the role of infinite expectation. To this end it is instructive to contrast
a finite expectation variant of the Shooting Room in which players lose their bets
with probability 35
36
; e.g., they win on double sixes and lose otherwise. Rounds with
identically mounting betting populations are again conducted until some group loses.
Call the venue for these bets the Brutal Room. The Brutal Room game again requires
an infinity of potential participants in order to ensure, with probability one, that one
can complete the requisite series of rounds, and we’d again like to assign draft position
priors in such a way that, at a postgame debriefing attended by N participants, each
comes to have a draft position posterior that is uniform on {1, . . . , N}.
As things are currently set up, however, this entails a uniform draft position prior
over the infinite pool of potential participants. Merely finitely additive distributions
(as we’ve just seen evidence of) are seldom, if ever, the way out of a paradox; more
typically, they give rise to them. A more useful first step is to recognize that one
can identify a countably additive draft position distribution that, when taken as our
participant’s distribution conditional on I play, yields a uniform debriefing posterior.
We identify the distribution. Denote by x the probability, conditional on I play, of
draft round D = 1. Since 9 times as many enter with draft round D = 2 (namely
positions 2-10), but round 2 takes place on only 1
36
of iterations, the probability, again
conditional on I play, of draft round D = 2 is x(9)(1/36) = 1
4
x. Similar reasoning
shows the probability, conditional on I play, of draft round D > 2 is 1
4
x( 5
18
)D−2.
Setting the sum of these probabilities equal to 1 and solving for x we get:
Pr(D = 1) = x = 26
35
,
Pr(D = 2) = 13
70
,
Pr(D = 3) = 13
252
, etc.
If now a participant shows up at the debriefing and there are (for example) 103 par-
ticipants present, her posterior draft position (not round, but position) distribution
will be uniform on {1, 2, . . . , 100}. This is because she knows one of (a)-(c) holds:
(a) D = 1 and two double sixes rolled after her arrival (probability q1 =
26·35
35·36·36·36),
(b) D = 2 and one double six rolled after her arrival (probability q2 =
13·35
70·36·36 = 9q1),
(c)D = 3 and zero double sixes rolled after her arrival (probability q3 =
13·35
252·36 = 10q2).
3All the more so in that they cite the Principal Principle in support of Prob(Lose|Selected) = 136 ;
see their footnote 3. (Thanks to an anonymous referee for this point.)
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This holds generally...regardless of how many players our participant encounters at
the debriefing, she will come to have uniform draft position posterior over the cor-
responding initial segment of N. Of course one might think that there is still a
potential complication...to achieve the draft position distribution we found condi-
tional on I play would still require a uniform prior, should we continue to assume
that the game is played exactly once and that players are informed as to their status
as pool members prior to learning that they have been selected to enter the room.
There is no such complication. Simply do not tell members of the pool that they
are such, or even that there is any such game. Then, there is no point in time at
which participants who are selected need to entertain credences that fail countable
additivity. Another way (our preference) is to assume that the Brutal Room game
has been played infinitely many times throughout an infinite past, and will continue
to be played throughout an infinite future. Indeed, we may assume for convenience
here that every being is chosen to participate in exactly one iteration of the game.
(Perhaps they are selected in order of birth.) Once a given participant has entered
their iteration of the game, the first participant in that iteration identifies an “origin”
and the participant may revert to our former talk of “draft position” and ‘draft
round”. Participants now may be told about the game; since I play is now a certainty,
however, there is still no need for the problematic uniform prior.
A Brutal Room participant suffers no Reflection violation. During her betting session,
her credence in I will be alone at the debriefing, is Pr(D = 1) times the probability
that the first roll is not double six, i.e. (26
35
)(35
36
) = 13
18
. Credence in I win at the
debriefing is 0 if they are alone and 1
10
otherwise, with expectation ( 5
18
)( 1
10
) = 1
36
.
Buoyed by this result, one might think to analyze the Shooting Room along similar
lines. We start by attempting to find a countably additive draft position distribution
that, if taken as a Shooting Room participant’s distribution conditional on I play,
yields a uniform debriefing posterior. Denote then by x, as before, the probability,
conditional on I play, of draft round D = 1. Since 9 times as many enter with draft
round D = 2 (namely positions 2-10), and round 2 takes place on 35
36
of iterations,
the probability, conditional on I play, of draft round D = 2 is x(9)(35/36) = 35
4
x.
Similarly the probability, conditional on I play, of draft round D > 2 is 35
4
x(175
18
)D−2.
But in order for these not to sum to ∞, one must have x < α for every positive
real α, so our participant is again saddled with a merely finitely additive prior. A
Reflection violation, too: the participant’s credence in I win is 1
36
during her betting
session, while her credence in I win at debriefing is 0 if she is alone and 1
10
otherwise,
with expectation (1− x) 1
10
≈ 1
10
.
More generally, if p is the (objective) probability that bettors win in a Shooting Room
style game (with round sizes fixed at 1, 9, 90, etc.) then the (subjective) probability
x of draft round D = 1, conditonal on I play, is equal to the multiplicative inverse
of the expected number of bettors in a given iteration of the game. x is therefore
infinitesimal (and the bettors’ credences conditional on I play merely finite additive)
if and only if the expected number of players, namely 1 + 9p
∑∞
n=0(10p)
n, is infinite
(that is, precisely when p ≥ 1
10
). Since Reflection violations don’t arise when the
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participants have countably additive distributions, then, such games require infinite
expectation in order to generate a paradox.
3. Conclusion
Our purpose here hasn’t been to “solve” the Shooting Room Paradox, but rather to
call attention to the fact that the number of players participating in a single iteration
of the game is infinite in expectation, and that if the conditions of the game are
altered to remove this feature, the paradox evaporates. The puzzle therefore takes its
place in a larger group of similar puzzles depending crucially on infinite expectation.
No extant treatment of any such puzzle should give one reason to be optimistic
about prospects for a fully satisfying straight solution4 in the case of the Shooting
Room; proposals that take the setup of such problems at face value invariably in-
volve Reflection violations, failures of dominance reasoning, merely finitely additive
credence functions, vulnerability to Dutch Books, etc. It might be argued that some
concessions are more benign than others, and that the inherent contentiousness of
determining which is part of what places such problems under the purview of philoso-
phers (rather than, say, economists or mathematicians). Even if that’s right, however,
infinite expectation is what constitutes the common character of these puzzles; not
to at least flag it looks, to us, tantamount to missing the point.
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